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Abstract 
The paper offers an exploratory empirical analysis of the impact on consumers’ 
welfare of the reforms of the gas industry in EU-15 area. After considering the key 
features of the natural gas industry and of its reform in selected countries, we study 
the relationship between regulatory reform indicators and price dynamics by means 
of panel data techniques. We find that none of the relationships between price 
dynamics and regulatory reform indicators is robust to different econometric 
specifications. Our findings suggest that until now there is limited evidence of 
beneficial effects of a standard package gas industry reforms for the European 
consumers. Country specific factors and price inertia seem to be more important 
than the reforms as determinants of consumers’ prices. 
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1 Introduction 
The advent of regulatory reforms, including privatization, 
network unbundling, regulation and liberalization in many European and 
OECD countries is often seen as a key tool for fostering economic 
growth and welfare (see Nicoletti and Scarpetta 2003). It is pointed out 
that heavy regulated markets imply negative welfare effects since public 
ownership and some forms of regulation distort the allocation of 
resources between sectors and between firms, ending up affecting the 
overall economic performance.  
One prominent goal of the European Union policy has been the 
attempt to implement regulatory reforms also into the energy industry, 
historically considered under conditions of natural monopoly. The 
provision of gas and electricity services at affordable prices is 
fundamental to increase the competitiveness of business and the welfare 
of household. In order to achieve this objective the EU came to the 
decision that radical reform both the in the gas and the electricity sectors 
had to be made. 
In the last 15 years, these reforms have yielded a “new 
paradigm” characterised by a general consensus over the necessity to 
carry out some common measures for achieving a well functioning 
market-oriented industry’1. Namely, three parallel reforms have been 
called for: a) the privatization of the incumbents (sale of existing publicly 
owned firms and licensing of private entrants); b) unbundling, i.e. the 
separation of network segments of the industry from the potentially 
competitive ones, associated both with incentive regulation of the 
networks and establishment of independent regulatory bodies 
empowered at guaranteeing a non discriminatory access to the network 
infrastructures; c) liberalisation and development of a competitive 
environment by removing barriers to entry. 
The implementation of this “paradigm” poses some challenges 
to policy-makers and industrial players, given that it is well known that 
large and integrated firms can often enjoy considerable economies of 
scope, scale or coordination depending on the degree of conglomerate, 
horizontal or vertical integration. This expected pursuit of efficiency may 
be at the expense of competition, in that large firms are likely to acquire 
a strong if not dominant market position, and productive and dynamic 
inefficiencies are likely to occur as a consequence. Energy sectors display 
considerable problems of this type, especially since in most cases their 
                                                 
1 On this issue, see Jamasb and Pollitt (2005). 
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current set-up has its origin in a long tradition of state monopolies, 
where vertical integration was the preferred arrangement2.  
An extended empirical literature looking at macro-economic 
outcomes provides some support to a negative view of vertically 
integrated monopolies. For example Alesina et al. (2005) find that 
regulatory reforms in sectors which were characterised by competition 
(transport, communication and energy) have had a significant positive 
impact on own-sector capital accumulation. By contrast, the evidence of 
more direct positive effects is poorer. For example Barone and Cingano 
(2007), do not find significant effects on the growth of the industry 
added value when looking at aggregate measures of services 
liberalization. Moreover, a focus on macroeconomic aspects, which 
mixes the issue of privatization with that of liberalization, has partially 
obscured what has been one of the primary goals of EU policy on public 
utilities and services, i.e. fostering competition in order to provide 
consumers with lower prices and more freedom to choose. 
Indeed, “the devil could be in the details”, and even market 
liberalisation could not bring significant positive welfare effects (e.g. see 
van Witteloostuijna, Brakmanb and van Marrewijk, 2007, for an analysis 
of the Dutch natural gas industry). Detecting which specific reform 
intervention is more likely to positively affect citizens’ welfare becomes 
crucial. As a matter of fact, some worries about the real effectiveness of 
the current patterns of regulatory reforms can no longer be concealed, 
and more articulated views such as that by the World Bank (2007) have 
appeared which, in comparison with the “EU paradigm”, leave more 
degrees of freedom to national policy-makers. With a more direct focus 
on natural gas, some recent literature is being pointing out the lack of 
recognition by the “European model” of the very nature of the gas 
industry, whose transmission networks, differently from electricity and 
transport, are oligopolies rather than natural monopolies (Jamasb, Pollitt 
and Triebs, 2008), and where the presence of companies with market 
power in the upstream and retailer distribution phase could yield ‘double 
marginalization’ processes in case of unbundling of vertical stages 
(Davies and Waddams, 2007)3. 
                                                 
2For a detailed history of nationalisation and consolidation in Europe see 
Millward (2005). 
3A different stream of literature has looked at “micro-level” economic effects of 
privatization and liberalization at the firm level. See for example Omran (2004), 
Okten and Arin (2006) and the papers cited therein. 
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Differently from some of the existing literature, in this paper we 
focus on first round partial equilibrium impacts (as typically done by 
applied indirect tax reform literature). After all, if consumers at large do 
not benefit directly from reforms, it seems unlikely that indirect benefits 
to them through impacts on other industries, or benefits to other agents, 
can change dramatically the evaluation4. In order to achieve a conclusive 
policy assessment, one should undertake a welfare analysis based on 
detailed micro-data on household’s expenditures, possibly with a 
decomposition of prices and quantities, and controlling for quality 
indicators of services such as access possibilities and contractual 
transparency. The key indicator for evaluating the success of public 
utilities reforms is consumers’ price, possibly with micro-data. 
Unfortunately, in order to undertake a cross-country analysis 
one needs to rely on average prices, with considerable information loss 
for those cases where there is price discrimination across types of 
contracts. Though, even if based on average prices, some simple policy 
questions can be made:  
• are European consumers facing lower prices than they would do 
if no regulatory reform processes would had taken place?  
• Given the plurality of tools which contribute to define service 
regulatory reforms, which are the specific policies that actually 
affect price dynamics and consumer’s welfare? 
• Given that liberalization is likely to be associated with 
transaction costs are effects on prices substantial or negligible? 
In order to assess how regulatory reforms have affected price 
dynamics, we combine price and regulatory datasets. In this paper we use 
a set of regulatory reforms indicators (REGREF), an OECD regulatory 
database which collects some indicators of privatization, disintegration, 
liberalization of several services of general interest across some OECD 
countries (Conway and Nicoletti, 2006). Information on prices is, 
instead, recovered from two standard statistical databases, EUROSTAT 
                                                 
4Quite surprisingly, significant indirect effects of utilities reform in spite of small 
direct effects are found in a series of studies, (namely Copenhagen Economics, 
2005; Alesina et al., 2005; Barone and Cingano, 2007). It is difficult however to 
understand how it is possible to get significant aggregate impacts if direct effects 
are minimal. There is some risk of omitted variables bias in aggregate estimation. 
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and IEA. Both these institutes provide net-of-tax series which cover the 
period when the European reforms have been started5. 
The structure of the paper is the following one. The next section 
reviews some features of the natural gas industry and its reform in 
selected EU countries. Data availability and the relationship between 
regulatory reform indicators and price dynamics is studied in Section 3, 
whilst in Section 4 the presence of any robust empirical relationship is 
looked for by means of panel data techniques. Finally, Section 5 
discusses the main results and concludes. 
2 The reform of the natural gas industry in the EU-15 
The natural gas industry is composed of different segments. The 
upstream phase includes exploration, extraction and production. The 
transportation system consists of a complex network of pipelines, 
designed to quickly and efficiently transport natural gas from its origin, 
to areas of high demand. Natural gas, like most other commodities, but 
differently from electricity, can be stored for an indefinite period of time. 
While some large industrial, commercial, and electric generation 
customers receive natural gas directly from high capacity interstate and 
intrastate pipelines, most other users receive natural gas from local 
distribution companies. Local distribution companies typically transport 
natural gas from delivery points along interstate and intrastate pipelines 
through thousands of miles of small-diameter distribution pipe. The 
retail segment is the last downstream phase of the industry.  
The historical structure of the gas sector in Europe was that of a 
public owned vertically integrated monopoly. This kind of organization 
was justified on the ground that the traditional benefits from vertical 
integration were generally strengthened by the burden of the long-term 
costs in the upstream phase (gas contracts, infrastructure investments). 
The significance of these costs required to minimise the uncertainty to 
sell the gas purchased in international markets through vertical 
                                                 
5The strategy we adopt here is similar to the one used by Copenhagen 
Economics (2005) to estimate and forecast the impact of market opening 
policies on overall price and productivity changes and to use this forecast as 
input into their simulation model of the European economy. We use, however, 
a wider dataset and a more robust econometric approach. We maintain that 
panel data techniques are able to get rid off of the national idiosyncratic aspects 
and of common trends, so that the effects of changes in regulation regimes can 
be detected. 
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integration and public monopoly. A direct consequence of this 
circumstance has been the development of the so called take-or-pay 
contracts. This particular type of agreements, largely diffused in the gas 
international market, are signed between the owner of natural gas (often 
a large state owned firm from non EU countries) and a large buyer who 
imports the gas and then resells it wholesale. This contract is meant to 
leave the owner with some price risk6, while the importer entirely bears 
the quantity risk (the risk not to be able to resell the gas purchased). The 
view of the European Commission is that, although these contracts pose 
serious problems to competition in retail supply, they do not necessarily 
require vertical integration. The importer and the seller may not be the 
same economic entity in the national market. By breaking up the import 
contract into several subcontracts, there are ways to guarantee the 
commitments that the importer has with the foreign producer firm 
without implying the creation of a dominant position in the national 
market. 
Following this approach the European Commission has 
promoted the liberalization of the gas industry by establishing a common 
set of rules and principles through two different Directives in 1998 and 
2003 (see Thomas 2005). These directives represent the milestones in the 
gradual but radical restructuring of the gas sector. They had initially set a 
mandatory market opening calendar giving the EU-15 member countries 
eight years to open their markets to competition. Subsequently the 
second directive stepped up the pace of liberalization in the move to 
establish a single European gas market. 
The EU is neutral on privatization (full or partial), but de facto 
there has been an association in the policy trends in several countries 
between privatization, vertical disintegration and liberalization. 
 
2.1 The EU gas directives 
The first European gas directive was adopted in June 19987. The 
directive lays down a set of common rules and procedures relating to the 
organization and functioning of the national gas sector. Its main 
objective was to establish a single European natural gas market 
integrated, competitive, and well regulated. The final purpose of the 
Commission was to give the right to freely choose the supplier to 
                                                 
6International prices may vary during the period in which contract conditions 
are set, even if usually the contracted terms are indexed to other energy prices. 
7 First European Gas Directive (98/30/EC). 
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household and industrial customers and to create a real market price for 
gas, based on the interaction between supply and demand.  
The general principle promoted by the 1998 directive is the 
Third Party Access, by which the owner of the network is obliged to give 
access to all the delivery requests through the network by the production 
and sales operators, setting a cost reflecting and non discriminatory 
access price. Third party access alone of course cannot entirely avoid the 
distortion that the incumbent firm can create to foreclose the entry of 
new competitors. Some sort of separation of activities was therefore 
promoted, but leaving the member states the freedom to choose 
between different alternatives: from the most radical that prescribes 
proprietary separation of the monopoly activities from the competitive 
ones, to a milder legal separation, reached through the creation of 
different companies under a common holding, to the weakest version of 
accounting separation. The last indication of the directive is the opening 
of the demand side, through the notion of eligible customers, a client 
that has the right to seek the most convenient supplier. This type of 
client is identified by his yearly consumption and a timetable is set to 
widen the portion of liberalized demand by defining lower and lower 
consumption threshold.  
On June 26, 2003, a second directive was adopted8, which laid 
down a set of additional common rules for the creation of the internal 
natural gas market and abrogated that of 1998. It included new measures 
intended to advance legal deadlines for complete opening of national gas 
markets to July 1, 2004 for all industrial users and to July 1, 2007 for 
households9. The directive also reinforced the obligation to keep 
separate account. Moreover, member states are enabled to impose 
transparent, non-discriminatory public-interest obligations on 
undertakings operating in the natural gas sector, which may relate to 
safety, security of supply, regularity, quality and price of supplies, and 
environmental protection. The powers of regulatory authorities were also 
reinforced, particularly as regards the control of the level of transparency 
and competition on the market. Despite the provisions of the two 
European directives that imposed a progressive opening of the market 
for industrial and household consumers, the actual results were more 
                                                 
8 Second European electricity and gas Directive (55/2003/EC).  
9Unfortunately, the OECD indicators of regulatory reforms in the members’ 
states that we discuss and use in the next section do not cover the 
implementation of this second directive. 
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limited. 
A possible way to detect the level of competition in the gas 
market is to look at the percentage of eligible consumers that have 
effectively switched suppliers. Table 1 reports this information for the 
EU-15 at the end of 2004. The situation varies considerably across 
countries. In UK the percentage of large users that have changed 
supplier is very high (50%). The situation in Austria and Germany is 
opposite with a switching rate below 10%.  
It is apparent that beyond the reach of EU legislation, real 
market opening is impeded by a number of obstacles. The European 
Union is striving to open up its downstream gas market despite the fact 
that its upstream sector, most of which is not subject to European 
regulation, is still controlled by a small number of market players10. 
Moreover the presence of take or pay contracts and long term relationship 
established prior to deregulation between producing countries and 
purchasers are now curtailing possibilities for short term exchange and 
opportunities for new entrants. As a result, in many cases a single 
shipper dominates the market and sells nearly all the gas available. To 
facilitate the entry of new gas supplier into the market and weaken the 
dominance of incumbent operators, some countries have introduced gas 
release programs whereby the incumbent must divest a portion of his 
portfolio of long-term contracts11. The development of competition in 
the industry is also hindered by technical constraints. The cross country 
gas exchange is limited by network congestion due to insufficiently 
interconnections between member states: capital expenditures in new gas 
                                                 
10Imports are highly concentrated in a small number of producing countries, 
located outside Europe. There is a structural lack of competition on the supply 
side, dominated by state-owned companies from producing countries outside 
the European Union, such as Gazprom, Statoil and Sonatrach which in 2005 
together represented over 45% of the entire European supply. Gazprom is a 
company mainly controlled by the Russian state that possesses the world’s 
richest natural gas reserves. Statoil is an integrated oil and gas company based in 
Norway. Sonatrach is the Algerian company active in research, transformation 
and transport of hydrocarbons. 
11These procedures are not provided under the two directives, but the European 
Commission has already imposed a gas release program by way of compensatory 
measure in approving some mergers (for instance E.ON-Ruhrgas in Germany). 
In some case a gas release program has been imposed by the national legislation 
(England, Italy, Spain) and by certain regulatory bodies (France, Denmark, 
Austria). 
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infrastructure currently represent a missing key to the emergence of a 
truly competitive market.  
 
Table 1: The EU-15 gas sector: switching rate at the end of 2004 
Country Legal market opening rate % Real market opening rate % 
  Large Users Households 
Austria 100 9 0.5 
Belgium 90 60 4 
Denmark 100 30 <5 
Finland - - - 
France 70 25 - 
Germany 100 7 <2 
Greece - - - 
Ireland 86 >50 - 
Italy 100 30 35 
Luxembourg 72 <5 - 
Netherlands 100 30 2 
Portugal - - - 
Spain 100 >50 5 
Sweden 50 <5 - 
UK 100 >50 47 
Source: Commission of European Community (a), 2005 
 
2.2 The natural gas market in EU-15: production, consumption 
and external trade 
The evolution and the maturity of the gas market in the EU-15 
differ considerably across countries. In some of them natural gas is 
steadily used as a primary source of energy while in others, due to the 
limited availability of internal resources and/or to the scarcity of 
interconnections, its use is very restrained. This frame clearly emerges if 
we look at table 2. The highest level of consumption is recorded in UK 
where natural gas has replaced oil as the main primary fuel and the rate 
of diffusion among the household consumers is very large (35% of total 
consumption). The second market in EU-15 is that of Germany where 
total consumption is slightly under UK but the share of household gas 
consumption is the same. Italy is the third largest natural gas consumer 
in Europe with a demand that has been steadily increasing in recent 
years.  
France, Netherlands and Spain represent intermediate market in 
terms of consumption. The French gas market is mature in age but the 
share of natural gas in primary energy requirements is small if compared 
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to other mature market and growth is not expected due to the 
dominance of nuclear power. As regards the small and Nordic European 
countries, the picture varies considerably depending on the geographic 
position and on the availability of internal resources. While Austria, 
Denmark, Belgium Ireland and Luxembourg show a non negligible use 
of gas both in production stages and for household consumption, the 
same is not true for Greece, Portugal, Finland and Sweden where the 
diffusion of this source of energy is very small because of the limited 
interconnections and in some case by specific choices12.  
 
Table 2: The EU-15 gas sector: main data at the end of 2004 
Country 
Internal 
producti
on 
(TJ_gcv) 
Total 
consump
tion 
(TJ_gcv) 
Import 
depende
ncy*  (%)
Household 
consumpti
on over 
total (%) 
Imports 
from LNG 
over total 
(%) 
Austria 77550 357055 -78 19.5 0 
Belgium 0 677290 -100 25.8 17.2 
Denmark 395033 223311 43.5 14.6 0 
Finland 0 183779 -100 0.6 0 
France 51530 1807998 -98 28.5 20.4 
Germany 685342 3750763 -82 35.2 0 
Greece 1337 102462 -98.7 1.6 18.4 
Ireland 32025 169708 -81 16.2 0 
Italy 493813 3066058 -84 26 8 
Luxembourg 0 111588 -100 10.5 0 
Netherlands 2864924 1708444 40.3 21.5 0 
Portugal 0 153733 -100 5.5 36.8 
Spain 14398 1159510 -98.7 12 37 
Sweden 0 41142 -100 4.8 0 
UK 4019594 4087717 -1.6 35 0 
Source: Eurostat 2006 
Note: * positive numbers indicate that the country is a net exporter 
 
Of course the use of natural gas and the dimension of national 
markets are also driven by the endowments of each country. The largest 
gas-field is located in UK and Netherlands. Germany, Italy and Denmark 
                                                 
12Greece, Finland and Portugal derogate from the provisions of the second 
European gas directive by virtue of their status as emerging or isolated markets. 
In Sweden nuclear power accounts for half of electricity supply. After the 1980 
referendum to phase out all nuclear power plants by 2010, the government has 
given priority to renewable sources to fill the gap left by nuclear power and this 
choice has hampered the further development of the gas market. 
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have also some gas-fields but with more limited dimension. A 
consequence of this heterogeneity of endowments is a situation of strong 
import dependency. Among the 15 countries considered, only Denmark 
and Netherlands are net gas exporters. This situation raises the question 
of the security of gas supply which has been evaluated in a European 
directive of 200413. At present, nearly all the gas imports into EU come 
from three countries – Russia, Norway and Algeria. Some European 
countries have undertaken the construction of new transport 
infrastructure, pipelines or liquefied natural gas facilities (LNG). In 
particular this last option seems to be very useful in order to enhance gas 
imports from new producing countries and to diversify the supply 
sources. Spain is the European country with the highest number of LNG 
terminal in Europe: 37% of total gas imports are transported by ship 
from very distant country such as Nigeria and Middle-East countries. 
The same approach was followed by France and Portugal where 
respectively 36% and 20% of total imports come from LNG terminals.  
To illustrate the diversity of the industry, in the following sections we 
briefly sum-up the main features of the gas industry and reform process 
performed to implement the two gas directives in selected European 
countries. The countries analyzed are UK, France, Germany, Italy, Spain 
and Netherlands. As previously pointed out in the remaining nine 
countries there is a relatively limited diffusion of natural gas. 
 
2.3 Reform trends  
 The opening of the gas market in UK was carried out well in 
advance of the requirements of the two EU directives. The process 
began with the Gas Act in 1986 which disposed for the privatization of 
the vertically integrated public monopolist British Gas and for the 
creation of a regulatory authority (OFGAS)14. The reform was concluded 
in 1998 when all domestic customers were given the right to choose in 
the supplier. In 1997 British Gas separated its retail division. It became 
BG plc and included the distribution and transmission network activities 
(Transco) while the smaller retail division, which had a small production 
                                                 
13European Directive 2004/67/EC concerning measures to safeguard security 
of natural gas supply. 
14At present, the Regulatory body for the British energy industry (England, 
Wales and Scotland) is the Energy Markets Authority, which operates through 
the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem). This was produced in 2001 
from the merger of the gas (Ofgas) and electricity (Offer) regulatory bodies.  
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division, but no network, became Centrica. In 2001 BG plc separate the 
Transco network division as a distinct company called Lattice but in 2002 
it merged with the National Grid Company to become National Grid Transco 
(NGT). The regulator therefore required NGT to separate the 
distribution and transmission sector. The distribution network was split 
into eight different regional businesses and four of these were sold. 
In contrast to UK, France was one of the latecomers in implementing 
the EU gas directives. The main texts governing activities related to gas 
are the 2003 and 2004 Energy Laws. These laws extended the powers of 
the French regulator in order to include also the electricity and gas 
sector. Furthermore they officially ensure the transposition of the legal 
unbundling obligation applicable to the Transmission System Operators 
(TSOs). Despite the adoption of the two directives and the legal 
separation implemented, the European Commission has evaluated that 
the unbundling of Gas industry in France remains still insufficient in 
order to avoid uncompetitive behaviours. In fact, the market opening is 
largely theoretical in France with a switching rate in the industrial 
segment not comparable with that of the UK.  
Germany transposed the second European gas directive by the 
Energy Act of July 2005. According to the provisions of the directives 
the Act established a regulatory authority (the Federal Net Agency) with 
competences in the gas and electricity sector. Despite the official start of 
liberalization in 1998 the market is still suffering from a lack of liquidity 
in terms of both capacity and commodity. Only one gas retailer has a 
market share above 5% and the switching rate between industrial 
customers and household is very restrained (7% and about 2% 
respectively). This fact can be attributed to a number of reasons such as 
long term supply contracts in the internal market; contractual congestion 
in the pipeline preventing new market entrants from acquiring capacity; a 
certain hesitation of the large gas producers to sell gas to new market 
entrants; the not yet completed implementation of unbundling.  
The first step towards the liberalization of the gas sector in Italy 
was the approval of Law 481 of November 1995 establishing the Italian 
regulatory Authority for Electricity and Gas (AEEG). At the same time, 
the partial privatization of the vertically integrated public monopolist 
ENI was performed. The transposition of the two gas directives was 
made by several legislative measures, taken in different occasions. The 
most relevant was the decree N. 164/2000 that gave a strong impulse to 
the creation of effective and increasing competition, liberalizing the 
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activities of importation, exportation, transportation and dispatching, 
distribution, and trade of natural gas.  
Spain gas market is relatively recent and strongly growing. 
Overall consumption of gas has doubled from 2000 to 2005 with an 18% 
growth in 2005. The country has implemented important provisions 
following the two EU gas directives. Full market opening, including for 
domestic customers, and regulated third party access, also for gas 
storages are effective since January 2003. Ownership unbundling, at least 
partially, of gas transmission system operators was implemented, as well 
as legal and accounting unbundling of distribution system operators. An 
energy regulator exists since 1994 (CNE). However some important 
elements of the directives still have not been transposed and the 
adoption of the implementing legislation has constantly been delayed15.  
Netherland is the second EU-15 gas producer country. About half 
of its production is exported to France, Germany, Belgium and Italy. A 
gas regulator (DTE) was set up since 1998. The most important gas firm 
is Gausnie. This company was previously owned by the Dutch state 
(50%) and by Exxon-Mobile and Shell (25% each). On July 1 2005, Gausnie 
was formally split into two companies, a network company that will 
continue to be known as Gausnie and a purchasing and sales company for 
natural gas, Gausnie Trade and Supply. The Dutch state bought out Shell 
and Exxon-Mobile’s holding in the network company, while the 
ownership of the purchasing and sales company remains unchanged.  
 
2.4 Market structures 
 Despite the European Commission advocates a single cross-
country policy reform pattern, there is still a large variability in the 
national natural gas market structure among the EU-15 countries. This 
picture clearly emerges by looking at Tables 3 and 4 indicating the 
number of firms operating in the different segments of the gas industry 
and the type of unbundling for the TSOs. 
In UK, the privatization of British Gas as a vertically integrated company 
prevented new entrants from came into the market for many years. 
However since the middle of the 90s the government required BG to 
progressively reduce its market share in the industrial market where it 
                                                 
15Spain is therefore the only member state with Luxembourg subject to general 
infringement procedure for non communication of transposition measures for 
both the gas and electricity directives, that are before the European Court 
(2007). 
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was replaced largely by oil companies. The main feature of the retail UK 
gas market is the progressive process of merge with the electricity 
market: all significant suppliers offer gas and electricity as a dual package. 
Centrica still holds about 60% of the residential gas market, with the rest 
of the market going to the five major electricity companies: 
RWE/NPower, EON/Powergen, EDF, Scottish and Southern, and Scottish 
Power. Britain is now facing a transition: from self-sufficiency in natural 
gas production it is becoming a net importer due to the declining internal 
production. To overcome this condition the country created the first 
trading connection with continental Europe via Belgium in 1998 and the 
links to Norway and Netherlands were successfully reinforced. Future 
projects include the creation of several LNG terminals in order to 
diversify the supply sources. 
 
Table 3: The EU-15 gas sector: production, imports and retailing   
(around 2005) 
Country Production and Imports Retailing 
 Number of 
entities bringing 
gas into the 
country 
(production or 
imports) 
Number of 
entities dealing 
with at least 5% 
of natural gas 
(imported and 
produced) 
Total 
number 
of 
suppliers 
Suppliers 
having a 
share of at 
least 5% of 
the total 
Austria 4 4 27 5 
Belgium 4 2 32 2 
Denmark 1 1 7 5 
Finland 1 1 30 1 
France 13 1 34 2 
Germany 27 5 700 1 
Greece 1 1 15 1 
Ireland 7 5 2 2 
Italy 26 3 389 5 
Luxembourg 2 1 6 4 
Netherlands n.d n.d. 25 4 
Portugal 1 1 10 4 
Spain 14 4 41 4 
Sweden 1 1 7 5 
UK 24 6 15 7 
Source: Goerten and Clement (2006)  
 
The gas industry structure in France parallels that in the 
electricity sector with one large company, Gaz de France (GDF) 
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dominating the market. It was fully public owned until July 2005 when 
22% of the shares were sold by initial public offer. There are two TSOs 
in the country: Gaz de France Reseau Transport (GDF-RT) and Total 
Infrastructures Gaz de France (TIGF). They have been unbundled in legal 
terms. The main providers of natural gas are Norway (27% of total 
imports), Russia (21%), Netherlands (20%) and Algeria (12%). A 
relevant portion of French total import (about 20%) enters via LNG 
terminal. In the retail segment there is a limited competition: Gaz de 
France has not separated its retail activities and dominates the market for 
industrial and household consumers, while two new foreign companies 
(British Petroleum and E.ON) are attempting to enter the market. 
 
Table 4: The EU-15 gas sector: type of unbundling for the Transmission 
System Operator 
Country Type of 
unbundling 
Country Type of 
unbundling 
Austria Legal Italy Legal 
Belgium Legal Luxembourg Not implemented 
Denmark Ownership Netherlands Ownership 
Finland* -- Portugal* -- 
France Legal Spain Legal 
Germany Partly legal Sweden Ownership 
Greece* -- UK Ownership 
Ireland Not implemented   
Source: Commission of the European Community (b), 2006 
Note: *countries that derogate from the provisions of the second European gas directive by 
virtue of their status as emerging or isolated markets 
 
The structure of the German gas market is characterized by a 
multi-tier structure containing five big companies at the import and 
transmission level, another 24 regional companies at transmission level, 
and approximately 700 companies operating at the local distribution 
level. Ruhrgas, with about 50% of the available gas dominates the market. 
It was taken over by E.ON, one of the two largest electricity companies 
in 200316. The main competitors of Ruhrgas are Wingas, a company jointly 
owned by BASF and Gazprom, RWE the other large electricity company, 
                                                 
16The condition imposed by the German authority for allowing the take over 
included the sale of its stakes in a number of different gas companies and also it 
was required to auction a significant proportion of its gas import contracts to 
reduce its dominance on wholesale market. 
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VNG and BEB. The German gas transmission system is operated by the 
five big companies plus a number of regional transmission companies. 
Germany disposes of a relatively diversified gas supply portfolio, 
including domestic production (18% of total gas supply), imports from 
EU member states (22%), from Norway (26%) and from Russia (37%). 
All gas imports are through the five big companies.  
The main participants in the Italian natural gas market are ENI, 
ENEL, Edison, AEM, Hera, E.ON. and Gaz de France. The biggest firm is 
still the former integrated monopolist ENI. The wholesale market is 
strongly dominated by ENI with 84% of domestic production and 65% 
of imports through five main infrastructures under its direct or indirect 
control17. An ENI subsidiary, SNAM Rete Gas (50% owned by ENI), 
owns and operates the domestic natural gas transportation system. 
According to recent legislation, ENI had to reduce its ownership to 
20%. There are about 430 local distributors in the country, while in the 
retail market at the end of 2006, 380 companies owned a gas licence. 
Most of them represent unbundled sales division of formerly integrated 
distribution companies. However the market is strongly dominated by 
three largest groups: ENI with a market share of 40.3%, ENEL (15.8%), 
and Edison (7.9%).  
In Spain the gas industry before liberalization was dominated by 
one integrated private company, Gas Natural. In 2002 the regulator 
authority forced the company to spin off 65% of the shares of Enagas, 
the private firm that controls Spain’s natural gas transport system. The 
country imports all its gas mainly via pipeline from Norway and Algeria 
but with a significant proportion coming via LNG terminals from 
countries such as Qatar, Oman and Nigeria. Spain developed in recent 
years a quite competitive wholesale gas market. The government 
introduced a gas release programme which operated from 2001 to 2004 
and resulted in six new entrants acquiring gas from the largest company 
Gas Natural. Gas Natural was forced to sell 25% of its contracted gas to 
new entrants to promote competition. After this process, the market 
share of the incumbent has reduced from 100% in 2000 to 48% in 2005. 
Despite the gas retail market has been fully open since January 2003 the 
overall setting is far to be considered as highly competitive. The 
                                                 
17TAG pipeline (mainly Russian gas), TENP pipeline (mainly Norwegian gas), 
Panigaglia LNG Terminal (mainly Nigerian and Algerian gas), TTPC pipeline 
(Algerian gas), Green Stream pipeline (Libyan gas). 
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switching rate since market opening is only about 5% and Gas Natural 
still strongly dominates the market for household with a share over 70%. 
In the Netherlands the gas sector is still largely controlled by the 
incumbent Gausnie. The dominant position of the company is still largely 
unchallenged due to its strong position in terms of production. This is 
reflected by the modest share of small consumer that has switched the 
supplier since market opening in 2004 (2%). The frame in the industrial 
segment is slightly different with a cumulative switching rate of 30%. 
Retail and distribution is carried out primarily by the same locally owned 
companies as retail and distribute electricity.  
 
3 EU gas reforms and consumer prices 
A comparative analysis of the effects of a common policy 
reform on the European residential natural gas sector is a difficult task. 
As recently documented and studied for example by Asche, Nilsen and 
Tveteras (2008), apart from the common feature of very small short-run 
demand elasticities to own price and a dramatic consumption increase at 
an aggregate level, large differences across countries can be easily 
detected in terms of shares on total energy consumption and natural gas 
grid coverage. Such differences are so large that a very wide range of 
elasticity estimates arises at the single country level, and hamper the 
reliability of estimates based on cross-country homogeneity assumptions. 
Moreover, changes in crude oil prices have historically had a prominent 
role in shaping natural gas prices, symbolised by the existence of   'rules 
of thumb' for determining the price of natural gas starting from crude oil 
prices. Despite the fail of these rules in relating these prices for last years, 
even most recent studies detect strict relationships which indicate that 
natural gas and petroleum products are substitutes or at least closely 
related (Brown and Yücel, 2008; Hartley, Medlock and Rosthal, 2008)18.  
Given these structural constraints which are likely to hamper the 
overall effectiveness of common policy reforms, it is however interesting 
to look for the effects of EU attempts to reform industry in the last ten 
years. The main sources of price data we consider are Eurostat and 
International Energy Agency (IEA). The main reason for using also the 
latter source is that correlation between the two series is not very high 
(under 0.75), probably reflecting different aggregations of primary data at 
national level. 
                                                 
18In turn, this determines a close relationship with electricity prices. E.g., see 
Knittel (2003). 
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Data on prices we use are household net-of-tax prices, disentangling the 
tax component from the final price charged to domestic consumers. In 
particular, the IEA time series of natural gas for residential use starts in 
1978 for most of the EU-15 countries and ends in year 2005. The 
EUROSTAT series started in 1991. In principle, the reference to net 
prices should allow for directly looking at any direct effect of regulatory 
reform on production prices. Eurostat prices refer to Gigajoules, 
whereas the unity measure for IEA is 107 KWs. We can get a first picture 
of price dynamics in the main European national markets from Figure 
119. It is evident that common shocks determine most of price variation 
in current terms. No particularly converging process seems to be in place 
in the period considered.  
The regulation indicators in service sectors which we use in 
this paper come from the REGREF data set (for details, see Conway and 
Nicoletti, 2006). Sector-level data are available for the following service 
industries: electricity, natural gas, road freight, air passenger transport, 
rail transport, post and telecommunications. All the regulatory indicators 
range on a common (0-6) scale from least (0 corresponding to full 
deregulation) to the most restrictive conditions for competition. In 
principle, several aggregate regulation measures can be created starting 
from intra-sector indicators (e.g., see Alesina et al., 2005), but in most 
cases one has to rely on the forced “cardinalisation” into the 1-6 scale of 
some ordinal characteristics20. This operation could be somewhat 
controversial, however, in several cases. For instance, while there is a 
                                                 
19Though the European Directives regarded the EU-15 countries, henceforth 
we are always excluding from the analysis Greece, Portugal and Finland, due to 
their nature of limited or isolated markets and the absence of complete time 
series in the two abovementioned data sources. Moreover, IEA data lack 
information on Sweden, whilst EUROSTAT does not provide complete series 
for Denmark. 
20See the appendix for details. As for the natural gas market, the intra-sector 
REGREF indicators present the variable “public ownership”, coded from 0 
(complete private ownership in the production/import, transmission and supply 
phases) to 6 (public ownership for all), the variable “vertical integration”, coded 
from 0 (vertical separation in all phases) to 6 (vertical integration for all), the 
variable “entry regulation”, which is a weighted average of legal conditions of 
entry in a market and is coded from 0 (free entry) to 6 (franchised to one firm), 
and the variable market structure, coded from 0 (no firm has a market share 
above 50% in either the production/import, transmission or supply phase) to 6 
(the same firm has a share above 90% for each phase).  
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clear ordering between private, mostly private, mixed, mostly public and 
public ownership, one may wonder whether coding these different 
options by means equally spaced values between zero and six may affect 
the results 21.  
 
Figure 1: Net-of-tax price evolution in EU-15 
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Source: (IEA) 
 
Although REGREF indicators provide a long yearly time series 
starting in 1975, we only consider years after 1991 due to the limited 
availability of comparable price information and the lack of institutional 
changes before the Nineties. This choice is also motivated by the 
acceleration of the European integration process following the signing of 
the Maastricht’s Treaty in the Nineties. Even the EU directives on 
network utilities can be seen as part of this process. Overall, stronger 
integration among European economies should increase the reliability of 
cross-countries comparisons such the one carried out here. By looking to 
the data reported in Table 5, the consideration of this period only seems 
a natural choice given that no indication of regulatory reform is detected 
by the REGREF indicators before 1994. 
The last year contained in REGREF indicators is 2003. Overall, 
we can therefore make use of an unbalanced panel composed of 13 
                                                 
21For details on the aggregation methodology followed by Conway and Nicoletti 
(2006), see Table A1. 
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years. Most of missing observations concern price variables, which are 
not available for a few countries where the market is limited. By 
excluding the above cited countries the minimum length of time series 
used in the empirical analysis is 7 years. The trend across the EU-15 
countries (towards reduction of public ownership, a less vertically 
integrated industry structure and a less regulated access to the market) is 
strongly affected by the 1998 European directives, as can be easily 
verified in Table 5, where the average REGREF indicator for the gas 
sector are reported. Clearly, there is a downward trend, but some 
heterogeneity across countries and across time remains.  
 
Table 5: Evolution of the average REGREF indicator in the natural gas 
industry 
Country 1975 1994 1999 2003 
Austria 4.5 4.5 4.5 2.7 
Belgium 4.7 4.7 3.7 2.6 
Denmark 5 4.5 4.5 3.2 
Finland 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 
France 6 6 6 4 
Germany 2.5 2.5 1.5 1.5 
Greece 6 6 6 5.2 
Ireland 6 6 5.4 4.1 
Italy 5.2 5.2 4.7 2.4 
Luxembourg 4.5 4.5 4.5 3.4 
Netherlands 4.5 4.5 4.2 2.9 
Portugal 5.5 5.5 5.5 4.1 
Spain 4 4 3.2 2.5 
Sweden 3.7 3.7 3.2 2.7 
UK 5.8 3.3 1.9 1.7 
Source: REGREF (Conway and Nicoletti, 2006) 
 
In Table 6 we make a step forward by showing the gas industry 
regulatory framework and (net of tax) consumer prices across the EU-15 
for some selected years between 1991 and 2003. The table is organised 
using the REGREF classification of reform status, which provides a 
measure of the degree of public ownership, vertical integration, entry 
regulation and market structure of national gas industries in the EU-15. 
In this table we distinguish between three possibilities of ownership of 
the industry (mainly public, mixed, mainly private), which can be 
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associated to one out of three possibilities of vertical integration of the 
network (integration, legal/accounting separation, or ownership 
separation), one out of three possibilities of market entry (free, partly 
free, no free entry) and one out of three market structures (the market 
share of the incumbent can be more than 90 percent, less than 50 per 
cent, or somewhat in between). Each cell contains the countries being 
characterised by a particular combination of ownership, vertical 
integration, market structure and entry regulation in a given year and the 
(net of tax) consumers’ price as percentage deviation from the EU-15 
average, which is reported in the last line of the table and is expressed in 
current Euro (or ECU). The first and last year considered are 1991 and 
2003 as Eurostat price data are not available for earlier years and 
REGREF indicators are not available after 2003. 
Focussing on the polar cases, five countries (Ireland, France, 
Greece, Portugal, Italy) in the early 1990s were vertically integrated 
public monopolies. Their prices deviate from the average in very 
different ways, with Italy showing very high (net of tax) relative prices, 
France close to the average, Ireland in between. France remains the 
country where privatization and liberalization reforms have had a smaller 
impact, however consumers’ prices has always been close to the EU 
average. At the other extreme, in the UK, since 1985 under private 
ownership, gas prices have been lower than the EU average and prices 
seemed to fall even more following full liberalisation. During the same 
period, the Netherlands had a private vertically integrated industry and 
prices were well below the average. In Spain, however, private ownership 
with limited entry was associated with very high relative prices, at levels 
similar to those of Italy. In Germany, a mostly private gas industry seems 
to be associated with lower prices in early 1990s than in more recent 
years, when prices tend to converge to the EU average and to be 
marginally higher. Under mixed public-private ownership Luxembourg 
over the years shows significantly low gas prices under vertical 
integration, even lower than in the UK. Denmark, under public 
ownership until recent years, has in most years consumer's prices below 
the EU average. Thus, it is not self evident that prices in some 
combinations of industry reform, are systematically lower or higher than 
the average. It seems that other country features are important, because 
the transition from one regime to another has a limited impact over time 
in the country's price performance. To explore this issue, we need to 
explicitly account for specific country features. 
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Table 6: The regulatory framework and gas prices. Selected years, in EU-15 
PO VI ER MS 1991
Pr 
91 1995
Pr 
95 2000
Pr 
00 2001 
Pr 
01 2002 
Pr 
02 2003
Pr 
03 
IR 12% GR   GR   FR -8% FR 5%     No 
free FR -1% IT 17% FR -6%      
GR   PT                   
PT   GR                   
IT 38% FR 7%                 
Partly 
>90% 
BE -4% IR 6% IR -2% IR -     
Integr.
Free 50-                 IR -     
Partly   DK  DK 21%       
Free >90%                     FR 2%
Legal/ 
Acc. 
Separ.  50-           IR -
Partly >90%             DK 19%         
Public 
Own. 
Separ. Free           DK 
-
14% DK -6%
         IT 19% PT 49% PT 51%     No 
entry          PT               
 LU - AU          Partly 
 AU  LU -         
Integr.
Free  AU 5%      
Partly        IT 20%     
             AU -5% AU 0%     
Legal/ 
Acc. 
Separ.
Free 
entry 50-         IT 14% AU 0%
No 
entry
>90%                     PT 43%
Mixed 
Own. 
Separ. Free 
entry 
50-
90%           IT 11%
>90% NE - NE -                 No 
free 50- SP 32% SP 29%         
Partly FI FI - LU - FI   FI FI
SW   SW   FI               
UK -9% BE 3%                 
                        
Integr.
Free  >90% 
  UK - BE 0% LU - LU - LU -
Legal/ 
Acc. 
Separ.
No 
free 
entry                         
Private 
 Partly 
50-
90% 
    SP 23% SP 20%     
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  <50% GE 
-
17% GE 7%                 
     SW 3% NE - SW 10% SW 11%
     NE - SW -1% NE - BE -3%>90% 
BE 3% BE -5% NE -8%
UK - UK - UK - SP 17%50-
90% UK - UK - SP 19% UK -
 
 
 
 Free entry 
<50% 
    GE -6% GE 5% GE 5% GE 1%
Av. current prices for EU-15  EU15 7.28 EU15 6.72 EU15 7.41 EU15 9.21 EU15 8.76 EU15 8.88
Notes: 1991 means year 1991. Pr 91 means price in year 1991, when available. The other labels are interpreted 
similarly. Numbers show the percentage difference from the average EU-15 (using available data).  
Source: Conway and Nicoletti (2006) for regulatory reform data and Eurostat (data downloadable from 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/) for gas price data. 
Legenda: PO=Ownership (public, mixed, private), VI=vertical integration (integration, legal/accounting separation, 
ownership separation), ER=entry regulation (Free, partly free and no free entry), MS=market structure (less than 
50%, between 50% and 90%, over 90%). 
BE=Belgium, DK=Denmark, GE=Germany, GR=Greece, IT=Italy, SP=Spain, FR=France IR=Ireland, 
LU=Luxembourg, NE=Netherlands, PT=Portugal, UK=United Kingdom, FI=Finland SW=Sweden, AU=Austria.
 
4 Empirical analysis 
In this section we estimate panel data models where natural gas 
prices are expressed as a function of the regulatory variables. Our aim is 
to test for the impact of the REGREF indicators on net-of-tax levels of 
natural gas prices faced by European households. As mentioned, for our 
empirical investigation we have used both the price data provided by 
IEA, and those provided by Eurostat.  
We have first explored the datasets by means of within-group 
and first differences estimators with time dummies, since these simple 
analyses have been the basis of some existing works which use the 
REGREF indicators22. Both prices series are expressed in Gigajoules. 
A within group estimator should provide results very similar to 
the first difference model where strong exogeneity and lack of 
measurement error hypotheses holds (Arellano, 2003). But as Table 7 
shows, strong differences between the two models exist. It turns out that 
the price effects estimated via basic fixed effect analysis (which, 
                                                 
22E.g., see Barone and Cingano (2007). 
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incidentally, does not display significant relationships between regulation 
indicators and prices) cannot be considered sufficiently robust so as to 
draw clear indications23. 
 
Table 7: Least Square Dummy Variable and First Differences Estimates 
Dependent variable:
 (net of tax) price of 
natural gas for 
households
Control variables
FE 
estimates
FD 
estimates
FE 
estimates
FD 
estimates
Vertical Integration 0.840 1.198 0.160 -0.141
st-error 0.777 0.857 0.105 0.135
Public Ownership -0.385 0.052 0.004 -0.049
st-error 0.589 0.896 0.081 0.139
Entry Regulation 0.013 -0.200 -0.061 0.035
st-error 0.492 0.506 0.065 0.073
Market Structure -1.607 -0.396 0.437*** 0.092
st-error 1.139 1.416 0.157 0.208
Constant         11.181* -1.040 6.651*** -0.131
st-error 6.494 1.348 0.890 0.207
No of obs 130 129 132 121
IEA PRICES EUROSTAT PRICES
 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
We consequently move to considering dynamic and instrumental variable 
specifications, which on the contrary are able to account for more 
general assumptions on unobservable heterogeneity components24. As is 
well known, the seminal contribution for this kind of models is the 
GMM approach by Arellano-Bond (1991), followed by a series of 
refinements such as the “system GMM” by Arellano-Bover (1995) and 
Blundell-Bond (1998). 
                                                 
23Due to the limited market size or the lack of sufficiently long time series, 
observations referred to Denmark, Finland, Portugal and Greece have been 
excluded from the analysis. 
24An additional problem of a simple FE specification is that it is more exposed 
to spurious regression problems related to the presence of unit roots in the time 
series which compose the panel. In order to reduce this problem, henceforth we 
consider price variations as dependent variables. 
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The model we estimate is the following dynamic specification, 
where the lagged dependent variable has been used as an additional 
regressor. Let itp  be the yearly household natural gas prices for country i 
at time t, itR  the vector of regulatory variables for country i at time t, Zit 
a vector of additional controls, and β a vector of time dummies: 
(1)  ittiitittiit ZRpp εβαδγρ +++++= − ''1, , 
where ρδγβα ,,,,  are parameter vectors to be estimated and εit is an iid 
(over i and t) disturbance term.  
In this model, time dummies can account for common shocks on 
consumer prices and oil prices, and following the Arellano-Bond (1991) 
article are considered strict exogenous variables. As for the additional 
controls in the Zit vector, their inclusion is aimed at assessing the 
robustness of the results to the presence of (time-variant) country effects 
which cannot be eliminated via first differencing. We have considered 
both sector-specific variables (namely national gas production, gas 
imports and gas exports) and macroeconomic indicators (per-capita 
GDP and consumer price dynamics). In addition, given the 
aforementioned relationship between natural gas and crude oil prices, the 
“Brent” series provided by the IEA has been included. 
As for the ρ parameter, which captures the correlation between current 
and lagged price variations, we must recall that one does not need to 
interpret it as a real structural parameter, given that in dynamic panel 
data analyses its estimated value subsumes the combined effect of true 
state dependence effects and correlation over time due to unobserved 
heterogeneity (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). In the case of feedstock 
prices, it is likely that true state dependence is actually small, so that a 
dynamic panel specification becomes a way to capture the effect of 
country-specific unobservable factors such as access to different 
pipelines with different import prices and the presence of different take-
or-pay contracts. 
As it is well-known, with panel data estimation the inclusion of a 
lagged dependent variable entails an endogeneity problem which yields 
inconsistent estimates of traditional random effects, fixed effects and 
first differences estimators. Consistent estimates can be obtained via 
approaches such as the GMM first difference estimator by Arellano and 
Bond (1991). More efficient estimates are obtained by means of the 
“system-GMM” by Arellano-Bover (1995), provided that the 
orthogonality condition E[εitpis] = 0 for s ≤ t-1 holds.  
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The results from applying the system-GMM approach for the 
estimation of equation (1) are reported in the following Table 8,25 where 
again both datasets have been considered. In order to try to contain the 
risk of “redundant number of instruments” problems, we arbitrarily 
contain the order of admitted lags to t-2.26 Standard autocorrelation and 
over identification test are reported in the bottom part of the table27 
Table 8 shows that the only common qualitative result common to both 
datasets is the (as expected) statistically significant effect from the lagged 
dependent variable. Columns (a) and (c) report the results from 
regressions where only the REGREF indicators and the time dummies 
have been considered. No significant effects from the regulatory reform 
variables could be detected in this case. On the contrary, when adding to 
the specification the country-specific controls “domestic gas 
production”, “gas exports” and “imports”, “gross domestic product (all 
in per-capita terms) and the “consumer price index”, there is evidence 
that public ownership is associated to lower prices. Incidentally, crude oil 
price is always significant, but the size of the estimated coefficient is not 
so high to account for most of the variability of the dependent variable.28 
 
                                                 
25In the regressions we are presenting the number o the instruments has been 
kept relatively low so as not to hinder the reliability of Sargan over identification 
and Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests. The quality of the results does not 
change when allowing for a wider set of instruments based on higher lag orders. 
26It is well known that dynamic panel data models usually produce lots of 
instruments, whose overall affordability is tested via the Sargan’s over 
identification statistic which, however, is sensible to the losing of degrees of 
freedom.  
27GMM estimators are valid only if there is no serial correlation in the errors. 
Including time dummies as exogenous regressors contributes to ensure this 
condition. Since the first difference of a white noise process is necessarily auto 
correlated, only second order autocorrelation test are reported. 
28  Moreover, all the regressions are robust to the inclusion/exclusion 
of this variable. 
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Table 8: Dynamic regressions with aggregate REGREF indicators 
IEA PRICES EUROSTAT PRICES
Dependent variable:           
net of tax price of natural gas 
for households
(a) (b) c (d)
Control variables
Lagged dependent variable 0.8344 *** 0.5520 *** 0.664 *** 0.3950 ***
robust st-error 0.1167 0.0637 0.050 0.1431
Vertical Integration 0.0361 0.1213 -0.054 -0.1114
robust st-error 0.0885 0.1272 0.095 0.0994
Public Ownership -0.0661 -0.1469 * -0.102 -0.1016 **
robust st-error 0.1013 0.0942 0.083 0.0512
Entry Regulation -0.0381 0.0353 0.078 0.1146 **
robust st-error 0.0620 0.0935 0.065 0.0557
Market Structure -0.2788 -0.1525 0.099 -0.0639
robust st-error 0.1998 0.2001 0.247 0.1850
Per capita indigenous production -0.0007 -0.0008 **
robust st-error 0.0012 0.0003
Per capita imports -0.0005 -0.0006 ***
robust st-error 0.0004 0.0001
Per capita exports         -0.0002 -0.0005
robust st-error 0.0002 0.0004
Consumer Price Index 0.0252 *** -0.0835
robust st-error 0.0096 0.0646
Per-capita GDP 0.0024 0.0020
robust st-error 0.0209 0.0054
Brent oil price 0.0820 *** 0.1355 **
robust st-error 0.0149 0.0537
Constant         3.1258 *** 0.4741 2.906 *** 12.0364 *
robust st-error 1.3514 1.6944 0.935 7.5025
Observations 107 107 121 121
A-B 2nd order autocorrelation test -1.822 1.705 -0.889 -0.445
Prob. 0.068 0.088 0.374 0.656
Sargan's overidentification test 39.54413 38.111 29.282 31.509
Prob. 0.2742 0.374 0.555 0.441
Number of instruments 52 58 48 53
System-GMM           
sample:1991-2003
System-GMM           
sample:1991-2003
 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
An additional check is to see whether the results provided by the 
composite original REGREF indicators are kept or reversed when 
considering more “objective” regulatory indicators, which can be 
immediately referred to the structure or the market of the gas industry. 
In particular, here we go into further detail by directly 
considering the “sub-components” used by the OECD for creating their 
composite indicators ranging between 0 and 6: 
• As far as the public/private ownership dimension, the 
continuous variables available are the percentage of shares 
30 
 
owned by the state in the import, export or production stage 
(henceforth PUBLIC-PROD) and the distribution stage 
(PUBLIC-DIST)29.  
• As for liberalisation, a continuous variable which can be used is 
the percentage of the retail market open to consumers’ choice 
(OPEN-CHOICE). Moreover, a dummy variable can be created 
for those cases where the market share of the incumbent is 
below 90%. 
• Regarding unbundling, we do not consider a proper procedure 
transforming into a cardinal or ordinal scale the presence of an 
integrated monopoly, legal/accounting separation or ownership 
separation. We therefore created dummy variables for those 
cases where distribution is separated from supply, there is 
ownership separation and or legal/accounting separation in the 
import/production and in the supply segment30. 
 
The results obtained by considering the aforementioned new 
variables instead of the composite REGREF indicator are reported in 
the Table 9. As can be seen, for the regulatory variables we have not 
been able to find any significant (positive or negative) effect which can 
be considered robust to the different specifications and datasets.31  
In the single cases where significant coefficients have been 
detected, the results sometimes go in an opposite direction with respect 
to the common view. Eurostat gas prices seem to increase more the 
higher the market share open to consumers, and for IEA prices a similar 
effects has been captured by means of a dummy for those markets where 
the incumbent share is lower than 90%. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29There exist also a third variable related to the percentage of share owned by 
the state in the transmission industry, but for most countries is nearly collinear 
with the variable related to production. 
30Up to 2003, in too few cases ownership separation was detected. 
31In addition to the specifications presented, we could easily implement other 
regressions where only the significant Zis have been inserted. These regressions, 
available on request, only slightly improved the statistical significance of the 
(remaining) included variables. 
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Table 9: Effects of “genuine” regulatory reform indicators on natural gas 
price dynamics 
IEA PRICES EUROSTAT PRICES
Dependent variable:               
net of tax price of natural gas for 
households
(a) (b) c (d)
Control variables
Lagged dependent variable 0.6368 *** 0.4418 *** 0.604 *** 0.3755 ***
robust st-error 0.1450 0.0996 0.064 0.1102
Public share in production 0.0008 0.0029 -0.002 -0.0027
robust st-error 0.0053 0.0035 0.001 0.0030
Public share in distribution -0.0025 -0.0105 -0.006 -0.0109
robust st-error 0.0091 0.0074 0.008 0.0072
Market share open to consumers 0.0032 0.0025 0.004 ** 0.0020
robust st-error 0.0023 0.0024 0.002 0.0018
Dummy for vert. separ. in production -0.1801 -0.0197 -0.082 0.1280
robust st-error 0.3189 0.1833 0.355 0.4573
Dummy for vert. separ.  in supply 0.0390 0.0932 -0.285 * -0.0343
robust st-error 0.4113 0.4076 0.165 0.1825
Dummy for vert. separ.  in distribution 0.2191 -0.2487 0.238 0.0231
robust st-error 0.4490 0.4111 0.288 0.2961
Dummy for share incumbent <90% 1.4784 *** 1.0829 * -0.220 -0.3475
robust st-error 0.4637 0.5617 0.449 0.4302
Per capita indigenous production -0.0013 -0.0010 **
robust st-error 0.0010 0.0005
Per capita imports -0.0007 ** -0.0008 ***
robust st-error 0.0003 0.0002
Per capita exports         0.0000 -0.0003 *
robust st-error 0.0001 0.0002
Consumer Price Index 0.0239 *** -0.0495
robust st-error 0.0117 0.0574
Brent oil price 0.0525 *** 0.1035 **
robust st-error 0.0155 0.0487
Per-capita GDP 0.0002 0.0019
robust st-error 0.0238 0.0052
Constant         2.4072 ** 1.7240 9.3970 *
robust st-error 1.1117 1.2572 5.5324
No of observations 107 107 121 121
A-B 2nd order autocorrelation test -1.219 -1.352 -1.015 -0.857
Prob. 0.223 0.176 0.310 0.391
Sargan's overidentification test 35.809 40.900 28.279 31.995
Prob. 0.4303 0.264 0.607 0.417
Number of instruments 55 61 51 56
System-GMM         
sample:1991-2003
System-GMM          
sample:1991-2003
 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
In addition to the results reported in the table, no significant 
effects could be detected also when considering for non linear 
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relationships by means of quadratic terms, as for example it is done in 
Alesina et al (2005) by using the REGREF indicators “cardinalized” 
within the 0-6 scale. Other specifications have been studied where the 
logarithm and the variation of prices have been considered as dependent 
variables, still without obtaining any robust and conclusive evidence on 
the response of prices to regulatory changes.  
Finally, let us also stress that fixing 1991 as a starting period of 
this additional analysis is of course an ad hoc choice, mainly driven by 
the correspondence with the Eurostat time series. We have however 
verified that as far as the regulatory variables are concerned, results are 
quite robust for any starting year of the panel between 1990 and 1995. In 
contrast, there appears a decrease in the importance of the additional 
control variables, as the process of European integration proceeds. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Our empirical analysis of the impact of regulatory reforms on 
prices in the EU natural gas households markets has been unable to find 
any significant effect. The impacts of the reforms, as far as captured by 
standard econometric modelling, seem to be small or elusive, and 
sometimes tend to be different from what could be expected under the 
'paradigm' (for example some results about public ownership and market 
entry). 
Further research is needed to understand why the effects we 
observe are so small and their determinants quite elusive. A critical 
aspect is to be related to the short T and N dimension of the panels we 
used. On the one hand, a large T is required for consistency when 
introducing the lagged dependent variable. In our case T is at most equal 
to 12 for a few countries, but it must be pointed out those variations in 
regulatory reform indicators started in 1994. On the other hand, it is well 
known that GMM methods in differenced form, as those used in our 
empirical analysis rely on a large N for consistency, and this is not 
certainly the case with at most 12 countries included in the sample. 
However, the above mentioned problems are of course shared by any 
other studies on the gas industry in EU. 
On the whole, we regard our findings as preliminary evidence 
that -up to now- there is limited empirical support for the welfare 
dominance of a standard reform package across the EU.  
For the natural gas market, the combined use of composite 
indicators and simple regression models could lead to misleading results. 
Disaggregate indexes of regulatory reform fail however to detect any 
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significant effect. We conclude that available data, at least at present, do 
not support the view that consumer's prices of natural gas are lower in 
the EU countries that have privatized, unbundled, and liberalized the 
industry than in those that have not undertaken the standard reform 
package.  
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Appendix A: The REGREF dataset 
The REGREF regulatory dataset has been created by the 
OECD.32 It collects information about indicators of privatization, 
liberalization and disintegration of services of general interest across the 
OECD countries for 18 years from 1975 to 2003. As regard the gas 
sector the database provide information about four dimensions: public 
ownership, vertical integration, entry regulation and market structure. 
-Entry regulation: this series is an indicator of legal conditions of entry in 
the market and it is coded between 0 (free entry) to 6 (one firm). It is a 
weighted sum of four different sub index each with equal weight, 
namely: terms and conditions of third party access (TPA) to the gas 
transmission grid; existence of national, state or provincial laws or other 
regulations restricting the number of competitors allowed to operate in 
the gas production/import segment; percentage of the retail market open 
to consumer choice. 
 
-Public ownership: this series indicate the ownership structure of 
the largest companies in the production/import, transmission and 
distribution segments of the gas industry. The variable is coded between 
0 (private ownership) to 6 (public ownership). 
 
-Vertical integration: this series is a weighted average of three 
indicators of vertical separation between different segments of the 
industry. It is coded between 0 (vertical separation in all phases) to 6 
(integration for all). The components of the index, each with equal 
weight, are: degree of vertical separation between gas production/import 
and the other segments of the industry; degree of vertical separation 
between gas supply and the other segments of the industry; existence of 
vertical separation between distribution and gas supply. 
 
-Market Structure: this variable is coded from 0 (no firm has a 
market share above 50% in each segment of the gas industry) to 6 (the 
same firm has a market share above 90% in each phase). It is composed 
by three different sub-indexes: market share of the largest company in 
the gas production/import stage; market share of the largest company in 
the gas transmission stage; market share of the largest company in the 
gas supply stage. 
                                                 
32  See Conway and Nicoletti (2006) for further details 
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The REGREF database provides also a summing index that is a 
weighted mean of the four different time series. This series, called 
Aggregate Gas Regulatory Indicator (AGRI), has not been used in our 
regression because we were interested in understanding the impact of 
each component on consumers’ satisfaction with prices and quality. 
Table A1 highlight the exact computation mechanism of this aggregate 
index.  
 
Table A1: Components of the Aggregate Gas Regulatory Index 
Index Weight Sub-Index Weight 
1. terms and conditions of third party 
access (TPA) to the gas transmission grid 1/3 
2. percentage of the retail market open to 1/3 Entry 
Regulation 1/4 3. existence of national, state or provincial 
laws or other regulations restricting the 
number of competitors allowed to operate 
in the gas production/import segment 
1/3 
1. ownership structure of the largest 
companies in the production/import sector 1/3 
2. ownership structure of the largest 
companies in the gas transmission sector 1/3 
Public 
Ownership 1/4 
3. ownership structure of the largest 
companies in the gas distribution sector 1/3 
1. degree of vertical separation between gas 
production/import and the other segments ½ 
2. degree of vertical separation between gas 
supply and the other segments of the 3/10 
Vertical 
Integration 1/4 
3. existence of vertical separation between 
distribution and gas supply. 1/5 
1. market share of the largest company in 
the gas production/import stage
1/3 
2. market share of the largest company in 
th t i i t
1/3 Market 
Structure 1/4 
3. market share of the largest company in 
the gas supply stage. 1/3 
Source: Regref database 
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